ADJ10501198 · May 17, 2024

Regular employment in California does not exempt applicant from the application of subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 3600.5; further factual development is required to determine if applicant was hired in California, which would exempt the claim from the bar.

From the decision · page 2We have considered the Petition for Reconsideration, the Answer, and the contents of the Report, and we have reviewed the record in this matter. For the reasons discussed below, we will rescind the Findings of Fact and return the matter to the WCJ for further development of the record on the issue of whether applicant was hired in California, because we conclude that regular employment in the state does not exempt him from the application of section 3600.5, subdivisions (c) and (d), and therefore that his claim will be barred by section 3600.5, subdivision (d) unless he can demonstrate he was hired in this state. We conclude that applicant's specific injury was not barred by the statute of limitations, and that further proceedings are required on the issue of the section 5412 date of injury for his cumulative trauma claim.

Applicant's specific injury claim is not barred by section 5405 due to receipt of medical treatment triggering the longer limitations period under section 5410; the cumulative trauma claim's statute of limitations status requires further development of the date of injury under section 5412.

From the decision · page 20The parties also dispute whether applicant's claims both his specific injury claim and his cumulative trauma claim are barred by the statute of limitations found in section 5405, which generally requires that a claim for benefits be commenced within one year of the date of injury, or within one year of the last time any benefits were provided. However, if an employer furnishes medical treatment for an injury, the one-year limitation of section 5405 is tolled, and the injured worker may instead avail himself of the five-year period to commence an action under section 5410. (McDaniel v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1016-1017.) "In other words, after the voluntary furnishing of benefits, including medical treatment, section 5410 extends the period within which an original proceeding may be instituted from one to five years." (Ibid., at p. 117.) The one-year limitations period of section 5405 then begins to run again "once a potential claimant has been fully informed that the employer and its carrier disclaim compensation liability for an industrial injury[.]" (Ibid.) The burden of proof for demonstrating

Applicant was regularly employed in California during a portion of his career

Favours neutral

The parties do not dispute this fact, but the legal question is whether it exempts the claim from section 3600.5 subdivisions (c) and (d)

From the decision · page 11We consider the question of regular employment first, because the parties do not dispute the fact that applicant was regularly employed in California during a portion of his career, and therefore the question is a pure question of law. Applicant asserts that just as subdivisions (c) and (d) do not apply when there is a California hire during the relevant injury period, they also do not apply where there is regular employment during the relevant injury period. If applicant is correct, we need not consider whether he was hired in California, because his undisputed regular employment would be sufficient to exempt him from the application of these subdivisions.

Applicant's testimony was ambiguous about whether his agents had authority to bind him to contracts in California

Favours neutral

This ambiguity prevents a determination of whether applicant was hired in California, which is necessary to exempt the claim from the bar

From the decision · page 19Applicant's testimony on this point was not entirely clear. For example, when testifying about his contract with the Padres, applicant responded "yes" when asked whether he gave Sosnick authority to accept the contract, and "yes" to whether Sosnick "conveyed the acceptance." (Transcript, 1/15/2018, at pp. 20§ 21.) Applicant averred that he had "already agreed to the contract" by the time he signed the written contract in Arizona. (Id. at p. 21.) However, applicant also agreed that he retained ultimately authority to accept or reject contracts. (Id. at p. 42.) And under cross-examination, applicant agreed that when he stated that his agent would "accept the deal on my behalf," he meant that the agent would "take [his] decision to the team." (Id. at p. 63.)

Defendant admits applicant received medical treatment for his specific injury

Favours Applicant prevailed

Receipt of medical treatment triggers the longer five-year statute of limitations under section 5410, preventing the claim from being barred

From the decision · page 21We first consider applicant's specific injury claim, which pertains to an injury sustained on either April 22 or 23, 2014. Because the Application for Adjudication was not filed until July 22, 2016, ordinarily applicant's claim would be barred by section 5405. Here, however, defendant admits that applicant received medical treatment for his injury. (See Answer, at p. 15.) The provision of this treatment triggered the longer five-year limitations period of section 5410. Contrary to defendant's assertions, an injured worker need not have received an award in order to benefit from section 5410's longer period; receipt of medical treatment is sufficient, as long as it was not made clear to the injured worker that the employer disclaimed responsibility for the

Labor Code sections 5405, 5410, 5412

Statute of limitations under Labor Code sections 5405, 5410, and 5412

Applicant's specific injury claim is not barred due to medical treatment triggering the longer limitations period; cumulative trauma claim requires further development of date of injury.

From the decision · page 20The parties also dispute whether applicant's claims both his specific injury claim and his cumulative trauma claim are barred by the statute of limitations found in section 5405, which generally requires that a claim for benefits be commenced within one year of the date of injury, or within one year of the last time any benefits were provided. However, if an employer furnishes medical treatment for an injury, the one-year limitation of section 5405 is tolled, and the injured worker may instead avail himself of the five-year period to commence an action under section 5410. (McDaniel v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1016-1017.) "In other words, after the voluntary furnishing of benefits, including medical treatment, section 5410 extends the period within which an original proceeding may be instituted from one to five years." (Ibid., at p. 117.) The one-year limitations period of section 5405 then begins to run again "once a potential claimant has been fully informed that the employer and its carrier disclaim compensation liability for an industrial injury[.]" (Ibid.) The burden of proof for demonstrating

Labor Code section 3600.5

Application of Labor Code section 3600.5 subdivisions (c) and (d) to cumulative trauma claims

Regular employment in California does not exempt from bar; hire in California must be established to exempt claim.

From the decision · page 2We have considered the Petition for Reconsideration, the Answer, and the contents of the Report, and we have reviewed the record in this matter. For the reasons discussed below, we will rescind the Findings of Fact and return the matter to the WCJ for further development of the record on the issue of whether applicant was hired in California, because we conclude that regular employment in the state does not exempt him from the application of section 3600.5, subdivisions (c) and (d), and therefore that his claim will be barred by section 3600.5, subdivision (d) unless he can demonstrate he was hired in this state. We conclude that applicant's specific injury was not barred by the statute of limitations, and that further proceedings are required on the issue of the section 5412 date of injury for his cumulative trauma claim.

Applicant's ambiguous testimony about whether his agents had authority to bind him to contracts in California

From the decision · page 19Applicant's testimony on this point was not entirely clear. For example, when testifying about his contract with the Padres, applicant responded "yes" when asked whether he gave Sosnick authority to accept the contract, and "yes" to whether Sosnick "conveyed the acceptance." (Transcript, 1/15/2018, at pp. 20§ 21.) Applicant averred that he had "already agreed to the contract" by the time he signed the written contract in Arizona. (Id. at p. 21.) However, applicant also agreed that he retained ultimately authority to accept or reject contracts. (Id. at p. 42.) And under cross-examination, applicant agreed that when he stated that his agent would "accept the deal on my behalf," he meant that the agent would "take [his] decision to the team." (Id. at p. 63.)