What the panel ordered
Findings and Order of March 17, 2022 rescinded; matter returned to trial level for further proceedings
Petition for Reconsideration granted; prior Findings and Order rescinded; case returned to trial level for further proceedings
What was disputed, and how it came out
Each issue the panel decided, with the reasoning it gave. An outcome is what this panel did on this record — not a rule, and not a prediction.
The Board found that the applicant's employment was continuous between the two employers and that the injury was industrially caused, but deferred the determination of the date of injury and liability to the trial level for further proceedings.
From the decision · page 2FACTS Applicant claims to have sustained a single cumulative injury to his psyche while working as a fire engineer. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence (MOH/SOE), June 9, 2021, p. 2, lines 26-32.) Applicant was employed by Ukiah Valley Fire District ("District") from 2009 through December 16, 2017, and by City of Ukiah ("City") from December 17, 2017, through 2019. (Id. at p. 2, lines 42-44.) On November 15, 2017, the District and City entered into a transfer agreement where employees of the District would transfer to become employees of the City. (Joint Exhibit J2, Ukiah Valley Fire District and City of Ukiah Employee Transfer Agreement, November 15, 2017.) The agreement repeatedly refers to the employees of the District as "transferring employees." Applicant's rank did not change. (MOH/SOE, supra at p. 4, lines 26-27.) His job duties did not change. (Id. at p.
The facts that decided it
What the panel treated as outcome-determinative, and which side it favoured.
Applicant's employment was continuous between Ukiah Valley Fire District and City of Ukiah under a transfer agreement
Favours Applicant prevailed
This continuity supported the finding that the injury was industrially caused across the employment period, affecting compensability.
From the decision · page 2FACTS Applicant claims to have sustained a single cumulative injury to his psyche while working as a fire engineer. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence (MOH/SOE), June 9, 2021, p. 2, lines 26-32.) Applicant was employed by Ukiah Valley Fire District ("District") from 2009 through December 16, 2017, and by City of Ukiah ("City") from December 17, 2017, through 2019. (Id. at p. 2, lines 42-44.) On November 15, 2017, the District and City entered into a transfer agreement where employees of the District would transfer to become employees of the City. (Joint Exhibit J2, Ukiah Valley Fire District and City of Ukiah Employee Transfer Agreement, November 15, 2017.) The agreement repeatedly refers to the employees of the District as "transferring employees." Applicant's rank did not change. (MOH/SOE, supra at p. 4, lines 26-27.) His job duties did not change. (Id. at p.
Dr. Mandelbaum's causation percentages assigned 45% causation to the 2017 Redwood Complex Fire and 10% to workplace interactions at the City
Favours Applicant prevailed
These causation findings supported the Board's conclusion that the injury was industrial and compensable.
What the panel did with the medical opinions
The role the physician served, and the weight the opinion carried. Physicians are named here as the decision names them; we do not score them.
Dr. Mandelbaum diagnosed PTSD and major depressive disorder, assigning percentages of causation to various employment periods and events, including 35% to a 2004 injury, 45% to the 2017 Redwood Complex Fire, and 20% to cumulative trauma and workplace interactions.
The Board relied on Dr. Mandelbaum's detailed causation percentages to find industrial causation and continuous employment between the District and City.
From the decision · page 2Applicant was evaluated by Daniel Mandelbaum, M.D., who issued two reports and are in evidence. Dr. Mandelbaum took a history of applicant last working on March 12, 2019. (Joint Exhibit 1, Report of Daniel Mandelbaum, M.D., November 25, 2019, p. 2.) Applicant was
The rules the panel named
Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Labor Code section 3208.3(b)(1)
Predominant cause of psychiatric injury must be actual events of employment under Labor Code section 3208.3(b)(1)
The Board applied this standard to determine compensability of the psychiatric injury.
From the decision · page 4DISCUSSION The question in this case is simple: whether applicant sustained an industrial cumulative injury to his psyche. The answer is complicated solely by the fact that applicant transferred employers during the period of injurious exposure. It is important to understand that separate and distinct analyses are used to determine causation of injury under section 3208.3(b), date of injury under section 5412, and liability for cumulative injury under section 5500.5(a). 1. Causation under section 3208.3(b). First, we must analyze causation of injury under section 3208.3. Per section 3208.3(b): (b) (1) In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is compensable, an employee shall demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury.
Labor Code section 5412
Date of injury for cumulative injuries is determined under Labor Code section 5412
The Board deferred the determination of the date of injury to the trial level.
From the decision · page 72. Date of injury under section 5412. The injury claimed in this matter is a cumulative psychological injury. Date of injury for cumulative injury claims is established under section 5412, which states: "The date of injury in cases of occupational diseases or cumulative injuries is that date upon which the employee first suffered disability therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that such disability was caused by his present or prior employment." (§ 5412; see also § 3208.1 ["date of a cumulative injury shall be the date determined under Section 5412"].) As used in section 5412, "disability" means either compensable temporary disability or permanent disability. (Chavira v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 463 [56 Cal.Comp.Cases 631]; State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
Labor Code section 5500.5(a)
Liability for cumulative injury claims is limited to employers in the last year of injurious exposure under Labor Code section 5500.5(a)
The Board deferred the determination of liability to the trial level.
From the decision · page 83. Liability for cumulative injury under section 5500.5(a). If applicant has proven that they sustained an industrial cumulative injury under section 3208.3, the parties must then determine who is liable to provide benefits. We emphasize that determination of liability is a separate and distinct analysis from determination of compensability. Under section 5500.5(a), liability for cumulative injury claims is limited to those employers who employed the employee during a period of one year immediately preceding either the date of injury, as determined pursuant to section 5412, or the last date on which the employee was employed in an occupation exposing them to the hazards of the occupational disease or cumulative injury, whichever occurs first. Liability for cumulative injury is statutory, and the statute focuses solely upon injurious exposure in the last year of employment. Section 5500.5 clearly states: If, based upon all the evidence presented, the appeals board or workers' compensation judge finds the existence of cumulative injury or occupational disease, liability for the cumulative injury or occupational disease shall not be apportioned to prior or subsequent years; however, in determining the liability,
What proof carried it
The evidence the panel weighed, by kind.
Applicant's employment transfer agreement showing continuous employment between Ukiah Valley Fire District and City of Ukiah
From the decision · page 2FACTS Applicant claims to have sustained a single cumulative injury to his psyche while working as a fire engineer. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence (MOH/SOE), June 9, 2021, p. 2, lines 26-32.) Applicant was employed by Ukiah Valley Fire District ("District") from 2009 through December 16, 2017, and by City of Ukiah ("City") from December 17, 2017, through 2019. (Id. at p. 2, lines 42-44.) On November 15, 2017, the District and City entered into a transfer agreement where employees of the District would transfer to become employees of the City. (Joint Exhibit J2, Ukiah Valley Fire District and City of Ukiah Employee Transfer Agreement, November 15, 2017.) The agreement repeatedly refers to the employees of the District as "transferring employees." Applicant's rank did not change. (MOH/SOE, supra at p. 4, lines 26-27.) His job duties did not change. (Id. at p.
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About this page
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