ADJ13262420 · October 20, 2025

The WCJ found, and no party challenged, that applicant was employed by Kenneth C. Ray and not by BBSI on February 10, 2020.

From the decision · page 4II. We begin with the issue of employment. The WCJ found that on February 10, 2020, applicant was employed by Kenneth C. Ray and that applicant was not employed by BBSI. No party has challenged those findings. Accordingly, those findings will not be disturbed. If the liable party is uninsured, UEBTF may potentially provide workers' compensation benefits to applicant. When this matter was already set for trial, applicant petitioned for the joinder of UEBTF in connection to alleged employer Compass and for the joinder of Compass. Orders joining Compass and UEBTF issued on December 21, 2022. Applicant requested the dismissal of Compass on March 15, 2023. There is no evidence that Compass or UEBTF have participated in the litigation. However, the WCJ awarded benefits to applicant against both Compass and Kenneth C. Ray, even though Compass and UEBTF did not participate or attend the proceedings. Additionally, the WCJ found that applicant, while employed by Kenneth C.

The WCJ did not specify which body parts were industrially injured; a finding of industrial causation cannot be made without identifying the injured body parts. Issue deferred.

From the decision · page 4Ray on February 10, 2020 sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment. However, the WCJ did not indicate to which body part(s) applicant sustained injury. A finding of industrial causation cannot be made separately or distinctly without identifying the industrially injured body part(s). Thus, the issues of whether Compass employed applicant and injury AOE/COE are not decided. Therefore, we do not award benefits, and we will defer all remaining issues. Article XIV, section 4 of the California Constitution mandates that the workers' compensation law shall be carried out "...to the end that the administration of such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance

Applicant was employed by Kenneth C. Ray and not by BBSI on February 10, 2020.

Favours neutral

No party challenged these findings, so they were not disturbed and form the basis for the substituted findings.

From the decision · page 4II. We begin with the issue of employment. The WCJ found that on February 10, 2020, applicant was employed by Kenneth C. Ray and that applicant was not employed by BBSI. No party has challenged those findings. Accordingly, those findings will not be disturbed. If the liable party is uninsured, UEBTF may potentially provide workers' compensation benefits to applicant. When this matter was already set for trial, applicant petitioned for the joinder of UEBTF in connection to alleged employer Compass and for the joinder of Compass. Orders joining Compass and UEBTF issued on December 21, 2022. Applicant requested the dismissal of Compass on March 15, 2023. There is no evidence that Compass or UEBTF have participated in the litigation. However, the WCJ awarded benefits to applicant against both Compass and Kenneth C. Ray, even though Compass and UEBTF did not participate or attend the proceedings. Additionally, the WCJ found that applicant, while employed by Kenneth C.

The WCJ did not specify which body parts were industrially injured.

Favours neutral

A finding of industrial causation cannot be made without identifying the injured body parts; thus, the issue was deferred.

From the decision · page 4Ray on February 10, 2020 sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment. However, the WCJ did not indicate to which body part(s) applicant sustained injury. A finding of industrial causation cannot be made separately or distinctly without identifying the industrially injured body part(s). Thus, the issues of whether Compass employed applicant and injury AOE/COE are not decided. Therefore, we do not award benefits, and we will defer all remaining issues. Article XIV, section 4 of the California Constitution mandates that the workers' compensation law shall be carried out "...to the end that the administration of such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance

Labor Code section 5909(a)

A petition for reconsideration is deemed denied unless acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board.

The Appeals Board issued its decision within 60 days of transmission, thus timely acted on the petition.

From the decision · page 3Former Labor Code section 59091 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (Lab. Code, § 5909.) Effective July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:

Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473 (en banc); Lab. Code, §§ 5903, 5952(d)

Decisions of the Appeals Board must be based on admitted evidence in the record and supported by substantial evidence.

The WCJ's decision must set forth clearly and concisely the reasons for the decision made on each issue, and the evidence relied on.

From the decision · page 5Decisions of the Appeals Board "must be based on admitted evidence in the record." (Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (Hamilton) (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, 476 (Appeals Board en banc).) Furthermore, decisions of the Appeals Board must be supported by substantial evidence. (Lab. Code, § 5903, 5952(d); Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310]; Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500]; LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) An adequate and complete record is necessary to understand the basis for the WCJ's decision. (Lab. Code, § 5313; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, former § 10566, now

South Coast Framing v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291; Lab. Code, §§ 3600(a), 3202.5

The employee bears the burden of proving injury AOE/COE by a preponderance of the evidence.

Applicant must show that proof of industrial causation is reasonably probable, not certain or convincing.

From the decision · page 6The employee bears the burden of proving injury AOE/COE by a preponderance of the evidence. (South Coast Framing v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Clark) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 297-298, 302 [80 Cal.Comp.Cases 489]; Lab. Code, § 3600(a), 3202.5.) The Supreme Court of California has long held that an employee need only show that the "proof of industrial causation is reasonably probable, although not certain or `convincing." (McAllister v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 408, 413 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 660].) "That burden manifestly does not require the applicant to prove causation by scientific certainty." (Rosas v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1701 [58 Cal.Comp.Cases 313].) Here, Compass and UEBTF have not participated, and there are no findings as to any body parts. Based on our review of the record, the evidence is not clear with respect to those issues.