What the panel ordered
Petition for Reconsideration granted to correct technical errors; May 12, 2025 Findings and Award rescinded and reissued with corrected employment period and injurious exposure date; substantive decision unchanged; award granted for death benefits, temporary disability, and burial expenses.
Defendant sought reconsideration of the Findings and Award issued May 12, 2025, which applied the presumption of compensability under Labor Code section 3212.1 and found industrial injury resulting in death. The WCJ recommended denial of reconsideration. The Appeals Board granted reconsideration solely to correct technical errors and reissued the Findings and Award without substantive change.
What was disputed, and how it came out
Each issue the panel decided, with the reasoning it gave. An outcome is what this panel did on this record — not a rule, and not a prediction.
The presumption of compensability under Labor Code section 3212.1 applied and was not rebutted. The applicant's cancer and death were found to arise out of and in the course of employment with CHP, with no evidence that subsequent employment caused the cancer.
From the decision · page 1Defendant seeks reconsideration of the "Findings and Award" (F&A) issued on May 12, 2025, by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The F&A, in pertinent part, applied the presumption of compensability in Labor Code1 section 3212.1 and found that applicant sustained industrial injury in the form of cancer resulting in applicant's death while employed by defendant.
The facts that decided it
What the panel treated as outcome-determinative, and which side it favoured.
Applicant's employment with California Highway Patrol ended November 20, 2014, which was the last injurious exposure period.
Favours Applicant prevailed
This date established the relevant exposure period for the cancer presumption under Labor Code section 3212.1.
From the decision · page 2The applicant worked for Defendant CHP as an Officer from September 9, 1991 through December 30, 2015 when he retired; however, Applicant's last day of physical work with CHP was November 20, 2014. (MOH/SOE, p. 2, lines 23-29.) The applicant thereafter was employed as an Officer for UCSFPD from September 19, 2016 through December 31, 2022. (Id. at p. 2, lines 25-26.) The applicant last physically worked for UCSFPD in December 2020. (Joint Exh. 3, p. 3.)
Dr. Richard Levy's medical opinion relied solely on the presumption of compensability and latency period analysis to conclude CHP employment was the more probable cause of cancer.
Favours Applicant prevailed
The medical opinion supported the application of the presumption and the finding of industrial injury.
From the decision · page 2The applicant was evaluated by Panel Qualified Medical Evaluator (PQME) Dr. Richard Levy. Dr. Levy found the cancer to be related to Applicant's work at CHP. (Joint Exh. 3; Joint Exh. 4.) Dr. Levy determined that the latency period for the cancer diagnosis in 2020 was likely 3 to 5 years but could extend 10 to 30 years before diagnosis. (Joint Exh. 7; Joint Exh. 8, p. 3.) While Dr. Levy confirmed that UCSFPD could not be excluded, as Applicant's employment with UCSFPD falls into the latency period, he ultimately concluded that it "was more probable that the exposure from CHP duties from 1991-2014 would have [been] deemed the time period, including latency, for development of sarcoma. It is more medically probable than not that the CHP period of employment was responsible in terms of employment duration and latency period than UCSFPD. However, UCSFPD cannot be completely excluded given the latency discussion from my prior reports." (Joint Exh. 8.)
Defendant failed to provide evidence that subsequent employment with University of California caused the cancer.
Favours Applicant prevailed
Lack of evidence rebutting the presumption or proving alternative causation supported the finding in favor of applicant.
From the decision · page 6opinions in this matter are based solely upon the legal presumption of compensability found in section 3212.1. Dr. Levy never addressed any method of proving industrial causation outside of the legal presumption. Applicant's subsequent employment with the University of California does not fall within the legal presumption. Defendant has provided no evidence that the subsequent employment caused applicant's cancer.
What the panel did with the medical opinions
The role the physician served, and the weight the opinion carried. Physicians are named here as the decision names them; we do not score them.
Dr. Levy found the cancer related to CHP employment based on the presumption of compensability under Labor Code section 3212.1, concluding it was more probable that exposure during CHP employment caused the cancer than subsequent employment, though he did not address causation outside the presumption.
Dr. Levy's opinion relied solely on the legal presumption of compensability and latency period analysis, concluding CHP employment was the more probable cause of cancer.
From the decision · page 2The applicant was evaluated by Panel Qualified Medical Evaluator (PQME) Dr. Richard Levy. Dr. Levy found the cancer to be related to Applicant's work at CHP. (Joint Exh. 3; Joint Exh. 4.) Dr. Levy determined that the latency period for the cancer diagnosis in 2020 was likely 3 to 5 years but could extend 10 to 30 years before diagnosis. (Joint Exh. 7; Joint Exh. 8, p. 3.) While Dr. Levy confirmed that UCSFPD could not be excluded, as Applicant's employment with UCSFPD falls into the latency period, he ultimately concluded that it "was more probable that the exposure from CHP duties from 1991-2014 would have [been] deemed the time period, including latency, for development of sarcoma. It is more medically probable than not that the CHP period of employment was responsible in terms of employment duration and latency period than UCSFPD. However, UCSFPD cannot be completely excluded given the latency discussion from my prior reports." (Joint Exh. 8.)
The rules the panel named
Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Labor Code section 3212.1
Presumption of compensability under Labor Code section 3212.1
Applied to find cancer compensable as industrial injury
From the decision · page 1Defendant seeks reconsideration of the "Findings and Award" (F&A) issued on May 12, 2025, by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The F&A, in pertinent part, applied the presumption of compensability in Labor Code1 section 3212.1 and found that applicant sustained industrial injury in the form of cancer resulting in applicant's death while employed by defendant.
South Coast Framing v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Clark) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291
Burden of proof for industrial causation by preponderance of evidence
Applicant must prove injury occurred AOE/COE by preponderance of evidence
From the decision · page 4II. When applicant claims a physical injury, applicant has the initial burden of proving industrial causation by showing the employment was a contributing cause. (South Coast Framing v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Clark) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 297-298, 302; § 5705.) Applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an injury occurred AOE/COE. (Lab. Code2, § 3202.5; 3600(a).) The requirement of Labor Code section 3600 is twofold. On the one hand, the injury must occur in the course of the employment. This concept ordinarily refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurs. On the other hand, the statute requires that an injury arise out of the employment. It has long been settled that for an injury to arise out of the employment it must occur by reason of a condition or incident of the employment. That is, the employment and the injury must be linked in some causal fashion.
What proof carried it
The evidence the panel weighed, by kind.
Dr. Levy's medical opinion based solely on the presumption of compensability under Labor Code section 3212.1
From the decision · page 3Dr. Levy's finding of industrial injury was based solely upon the presumption of compensability. (Joint Exhibit 3, p. 7; Joint Exhibit 5, p. 5; Joint Exhibit 6, p. 4; Joint Exhibit 9, p. 6.) Nowhere within his reporting does he address causation of cancer using a traditional analysis. (See generally, id.)
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