Applicant's wife testified she was paid to provide home healthcare from January 27, 2023 through April 27, 2023
Favours Applicant prevailed
Supports applicant's claim that home care was provided and relevant to the dispute over treatment obligation
From the decision · page 3The Defendant stipulated to provide home healthcare services for a period of 90
days. The Applicant's wife testified she was paid to provide home healthcare from
January 27, 2023 through April 27, 2023. (See MOH/SOE September 7, 2023, p. 2
ll. 23§ 24) The Defendant, pursuant to the terms of the stipulations terminated
payments for home healthcare service, and LVN care after the 90 day period
expired.
The January 3, 2023 Stipulation explicitly required defendant to provide home care for 90 days and LVN care for an indeterminate period
Favours Applicant prevailed
The WCJ misconstrued the stipulation to require LVN treatment for only 90 days and found no obligation to continue treatment after that period, which was unsupported by the record
From the decision · page 5However, the Stipulation provides that defendant shall: (1) "pay a family member of the
Applicant, $17.00 an hour, or hire an outside agency, for up to 28 hours per week of Home Care,
for [90 days]"; and (2) "allow a once per week visit by an LVN to refill medications/pill box for
the applicant." (Ex. 5, Stipulation and Order, January 3, 2023, pp. 1:14-2:22.) Thus, the
Stipulation explicitly requires defendant to provide home care for a ninety-day period and to
provide LVN care for an unstated, indeterminate period.
No evidence showed that home care and LVN treatments were requested or authorized before the January 3, 2023 Stipulation
Favours Applicant prevailed
This lack of evidence prevented a clear finding on defendant's obligation to provide treatments and whether Patterson's burden to show a change in condition applied
From the decision · page 5In addition, we are unable to discern support for the finding that defendant was not required
to provide home care and LVN treatments on the grounds that the ninety-day period had expired
in the first instance because, regardless of whether or not the treatments were limited to ninety
days, the record fails to show how, if at all, the treatments were requested or authorized.