California WCABLaw firm

Michael Sullivan & Associates

Michael Sullivan & Associates is named in 181 released California WCAB decisions from 2009–2026. The disputes run to AOE/COE (37), Jurisdiction / venue (16) and Permanent disability rating (13). They were heard most often at Van Nuys, then Los Angeles. The firm it meets most often is Perez Law, PC (5).

Decisions: 181
Years: 2009–2026
Issues disputed: 19
District offices: 24

Defense sideRead off how the firm is printed in the service list of its own decisions — 139 of 160 agree. It is our reading of the record, not the firm’s description of itself.

What they litigate

Disputed issues across the decisions this firm is named in. Every row opens the decisions it counts.

By disputed issue

Decisions naming this firm, counted by what was in dispute.

114 decisions across the groups shown

Who they face

71 more firms appear in the same decisions and are not listed: we could not read which side they were on.

Carriers and administrators

Where they appear

Van Nuys 18
Los Angeles 17
Oakland 16
Riverside 13
Santa Ana 13
Anaheim 12
Bakersfield 9
Marina del Rey 9
San Bernardino 9
Fresno 8
Pomona 8
Sacramento 8

How the appealed decisions came out

These are decisions that were appealed and published — the tail of a system that mostly settles. Most claims end in a compromise and release or a stipulation and never reach a panel, so nothing below describes how this firm does its work. It describes how a set of appealed disputes came out.

92 for the defense
61 for the applicant
30 returned for more record

Counted over 175 appealed decisions. Not this firm’s book of work. A decision that went one way on one issue and the other way on another is counted in both columns, so the figures add up to more than the total.

Decisions

Newest decisions this firm is named in, each with the passage the panel turned on and a link to the official PDF.

ADJ8984436 · 2026-06-30 · Riverside District OfficePsyche AOE/COEapplicant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.151. the applicant, age 31 at the time of injury, while employed during the period from November 5, 2005 through April 9, 2013, as a senior investigative technician, occupation group number in dispute, at Riverside, California, by the County of Riverside, permissibly self-insured and self-administered, sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment to her psyche and internal system.
The Appeals Board found that applicant sustained injury to psyche and internal system arising out of employment, and that defendant did not meet its burden to prove the injury was barred by lawful, non-discriminatory, good faith personnel actions under Labor Code section 3208.5(h).
Official decision · page 15 →
ADJ10966476 · 2026-05-29 · Los Angeles District OfficeMedical treatment / UR / IMRapplicant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.8performed any investigation into the need for home health care services during that period. Therefore, the record confirms the need for home health care services during the period July 4, 2018 to October 17, 2019. We also conclude that the evidentiary record supports the reasonableness of the services in accordance with the medical treatment utilization schedule for home health care services.
The WCAB found that the widow was entitled to reimbursement for home health care services from July 4, 2018 to October 17, 2019 based on medical prescriptions and defendant's failure to investigate the need for such care, consistent with Labor Code and case law requirements.
Official decision · page 8 →
ADJ19640948 · 2026-05-19 · San Francisco District OfficeJurisdiction / venueapplicant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.71. Parties to a workers' compensation proceeding retain the fundamental right to due process and a fair hearing under both the California and United States Constitutions. (Rucker v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151, 157-158 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 805].) A fair hearing is "one of `the rudiments of fair play' assured to every litigant...." (Id. at p. 158.) As stated by the Supreme Court of California in Carstens v. Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 572, "the commission...must find facts and declare and enforce rights and liabilities, -- in short, it acts as a court, and it must observe the mandate of the constitution of the United States that this cannot be done except after due process of law." (Id. at p. 577.) A fair hearing includes, but is not limited to, the opportunity to offer evidence in rebuttal. (See Gangwish v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1295 [66 Cal.Comp.Cases 584].) Indeed: Although the California Constitution states that a goal of workers' compensation proceedings is to "accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character...." (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4), the right to due process is paramount to the goal of conducting workers' compensation proceedings expeditiously. We therefore conclude that denial of a fair trial to a [party] is reversible per se.
Applicant was denied the opportunity to cross-examine PQME Dr. Schmitz on a significant supplemental report, which denied her a fair trial and due process, warranting reconsideration and further proceedings.
Official decision · page 7 →
ADJ19532643 · 2026-05-18 · Marina del Rey District OfficeTemporary disabilityapplicant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.7At trial, when the Applicant was presented with this deposition testimony, she explained that she may have misspoken at the deposition, and that it was more a desire to retire just from CVS, (MOH/SOE page 6, lines 12-14). She stated that she is planning to renew her pharmaceutical license, and that as of the date of trial, she was taking the necessary classes towards that end, (MOH/SOE page 5, lines 9-12). She further testified that a job in the pharmaceutical field was offered to her sometime in April or May of 2024, but due to her shoulder injury, she did not accept it, and that she does not [at this time] feel comfortable returning to the work force, (MOH/SOE page 5, lines 17-25). She is currently looking online for work opportunities, and testified that when she retired from CVS, she told management that she was intending to retire from that company only, (MOH/SOE page 6, lines 1-5). No witnesses from management at CVS provided testimony contradicting the last statement.
The WCJ found applicant intended to retire only from the employer, not the labor market entirely, supported by credible trial testimony showing willingness to work post-retirement despite injury, and no contrary evidence from defendant.
Official decision · page 7 →
ADJ16023818 · 2026-05-08 · Van Nuys District OfficeTemporary disabilityapplicant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.7Here, we apply the above reasoning with respect to our responsibility to consider the actual language of the agreement to the Stipulations. Paragraphs 1 and 2 require that the information must be correctly provided. Here, it was not. In Paragraph 1, which is a stipulation as to injury and the date of injury, the injury was described as a specific injury. In Paragraph 2, which is a stipulation as to temporary disability, including periods of payment and rate of payment, the only statement was "SEE BELOW." Moreover, there is nothing in Paragraph 9 to indicate what type of temporary
The WCAB found that the Stipulations did not resolve the period of temporary disability from December 29, 2021 through June 3, 2022, and that the WCJ failed to properly analyze the restoration of time and payment rate. The WCAB granted reconsideration and returned the matter for further proceedings to determine the correct periods and amounts owed.
Official decision · page 7 →
ADJ11351201 · 2026-05-07 · Los Angeles District OfficeAOE/COEremanded
Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of the Findings and Order (F&O) issued on February 27, 2023, by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The WCJ found in pertinent part that applicant did not sustain industrial injury to his eyes, neck, shoulders, arms, hands, fingers, legs, ankles, circulatory and excretory system, and psyche and ordered that applicant take nothing on his claims.
The WCAB found the record insufficient to resolve conflicting medical opinions on industrial causation, including orthopedic, neurological, and psychiatric claims, requiring further development of the medical record.
Official decision · page 1 →
ADJ21172307 · 2026-04-27 · Sacramento District OfficeAOE/COEdefendant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.3Liability for workers' compensation accrues for an injury "arising out of and in the course of the employment." (Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a).) Injuries sustained while an employee is "going and coming" to and from the place of employment do not normally arise out of and in the course of employment because the employee is neither providing benefit to the employer nor under the control of the employer during that commute. (Santa Rosa Junior College v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 345, 351§ 352 [1985 Cal. LEXIS 410]; Hinojosa v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 157 [37 Cal.Comp.Cases 734].) "[T]he going and coming rule applies when the employee is commuting between his home and work or, as Hinojosa characterizes it, it applies to a `local commute enroute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours.' (Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 157.)" (Zhu v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1031, 1038 [82 Cal.Comp.Cases 692].)
The WCJ and the Board found that the injury occurred during the applicant's regular commute and did not fall within any exceptions to the going and coming rule, including the zone of employment or special risk exceptions, and thus the claim was barred.
Official decision · page 3 →
ADJ20169304 · 2026-04-20 · Redding District OfficePsyche AOE/COEremanded
Determinative passage · p.11evidence. PQME Dr. Taylor discusses many contributing factors he believes have a bearing on the cause of applicant's claimed injury to provide percentages of causation, but PQME Dr. Taylor does not provide the reasoning linking the factors to the injury. This defect is not cured by referring to clinical expertise and years of training. Further, PQME Dr. Taylor provided opinions based on an incomplete record and appears to have relied on an incorrect history. In summary, PQME Dr. Taylor's opinions are not substantial evidence. (Hegglin, supra, pp. 169-170.)
PQME Dr. Taylor's opinions on causation were found not to be substantial medical evidence due to lack of reasoning, incomplete record, and incorrect history; therefore, the matter was remanded for further proceedings.
Official decision · page 11 →
ADJ19984698 · 2026-04-14 · Marina del Rey District OfficeQME/AME processdefendant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.1Defendant seeks removal of the Joint Findings of Fact and Order (F&O) issued on January 12, 2026 by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The F&O found, in pertinent part, that applicant validly requested a Replacement QME Panel on March 5, 2025 (to replace panel number 3593170). The WCJ ordered that replacement QME panel number 3622506 replace panel number 3593170, leaving, after the striking process previously performed by the parties, Kofi D. Agyeman, M.D., as the orthopedic surgery QME in these matters.
The WCJ and Appeals Board found that the applicant validly requested a replacement QME panel due to Dr. Willoughby's unavailability to schedule within 120 days, and that the replacement panel and Dr. Agyeman as QME were properly appointed.
Official decision · page 1 →
ADJ21105749 · 2026-04-14 · Redding District OfficeAOE/COEdefendant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of a workers' compensation administrative law judge's (WCJ) Findings and Order of January 5, 2026, wherein it was found that applicant "did not sustain any injury arising out of and occurring in the course of employment." Applicant claimed that while employed on June 4, 2025 as an IT Analyst, he sustained industrial injury to his right shoulder.
The WCJ's credibility determinations were supported by substantial evidence, including witness testimony and applicant's inconsistent statements, leading to denial of industrial injury claim.
Official decision · page 1 →
ADJ9744423 · 2026-03-27 · Sacramento District OfficeSJDB voucherapplicant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.5Here, the WCJ issued a finding that defendant mailed the SJDV to applicant's address on the Official Address Record, which appears correct. However, the unrebutted testimony of applicant is that he was not living at that address at the time of service and that he did not receive the voucher. The WCJ found applicant's testimony credible. (See Garza, supra.) Thus, the evidentiary presumption is rebutted, and we will find that applicant did not receive the SJDV that defendant mailed in 2019.
Applicant's credible testimony that he did not receive the voucher rebutted the presumption of receipt, leading to a finding that applicant did not receive the voucher mailed to the official address record.
Official decision · page 5 →
ADJ13057169 · 2026-03-12 · San Francisco District OfficePermanent disability ratingapplicant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.8Defendant contends that the WCJ's adoption of Dr. Burt's Almaraz-Guzman rating was an "improper deviation from the permanent disability rating schedule." (Petition, p. 10.)
The WCJ's adoption of Dr. Burt's Almaraz-Guzman rating was supported by substantial medical evidence, including a thorough explanation of the alternative rating method and the synergistic effect of multiple injuries, consistent with Almaraz-Guzman II and Vigil standards.
Official decision · page 8 →

Also recorded as

The same firm is printed several ways across the decisions, and all of them were counted as one. These are the twelve commonest of 17.

MICHAEL SULLIVAN & ASSOCIATES
MICHAEL SULLIVAN & ASSOCIATES LLP
Michael Sullivan & Associates
Michael Sullivan & Associates LLP
MICHAEL SULLIVAN AND ASSOCIATES
MICHAEL SULLIVAN & ASSOCIATES, LLP
MICHAEL SULLIVAN LAW
Michael Sullivan & Associates, LLP
Michael Sullivan and Associates
Law Office of Michael Sullivan
LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL SULLIVAN & ASSOCIATES
Law Offices of Michael Sullivan

Is this your firm and something here is wrong? Tell us and we will fix it. Every figure on this page is a count of released decisions this firm is named in, and the decisions themselves are listed above with the passage each turned on.

Also on this

Private workspace

Your case already resembles someone else’s. Find whose.

Paste the dispute. The extractor builds the factors, the search finds the decisions the same facts won, and the matter stays saved. Free account.

Start a matter Search without an account →

Michael Sullivan & Associates

Decisions

181

Years

2009–2026

Issues disputed

District offices

What they litigate

Disputed issues across the decisions this firm is named in. Every row opens the decisions it counts.

How the appealed decisions came out

92 for the defense

61 for the applicant

30 returned for more record

Decisions

Newest decisions this firm is named in, each with the passage the panel turned on and a link to the official PDF.

ADJ8984436 · 2026-06-30 · Riverside District OfficePsyche AOE/COEapplicant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.151. the applicant, age 31 at the time of injury, while employed during the period from November 5, 2005 through April 9, 2013, as a senior investigative technician, occupation group number in dispute, at Riverside, California, by the County of Riverside, permissibly self-insured and self-administered, sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment to her psyche and internal system.

The Appeals Board found that applicant sustained injury to psyche and internal system arising out of employment, and that defendant did not meet its burden to prove the injury was barred by lawful, non-discriminatory, good faith personnel actions under Labor Code section 3208.5(h).

Official decision · page 15 →

ADJ10966476 · 2026-05-29 · Los Angeles District OfficeMedical treatment / UR / IMRapplicant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.8performed any investigation into the need for home health care services during that period. Therefore, the record confirms the need for home health care services during the period July 4, 2018 to October 17, 2019. We also conclude that the evidentiary record supports the reasonableness of the services in accordance with the medical treatment utilization schedule for home health care services.

The WCAB found that the widow was entitled to reimbursement for home health care services from July 4, 2018 to October 17, 2019 based on medical prescriptions and defendant's failure to investigate the need for such care, consistent with Labor Code and case law requirements.

Official decision · page 8 →

ADJ19640948 · 2026-05-19 · San Francisco District OfficeJurisdiction / venueapplicant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.71. Parties to a workers' compensation proceeding retain the fundamental right to due process and a fair hearing under both the California and United States Constitutions. (Rucker v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151, 157-158 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 805].) A fair hearing is "one of `the rudiments of fair play' assured to every litigant...." (Id. at p. 158.) As stated by the Supreme Court of California in Carstens v. Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 572, "the commission...must find facts and declare and enforce rights and liabilities, -- in short, it acts as a court, and it must observe the mandate of the constitution of the United States that this cannot be done except after due process of law." (Id. at p. 577.) A fair hearing includes, but is not limited to, the opportunity to offer evidence in rebuttal. (See Gangwish v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1295 [66 Cal.Comp.Cases 584].) Indeed: Although the California Constitution states that a goal of workers' compensation proceedings is to "accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character...." (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4), the right to due process is paramount to the goal of conducting workers' compensation proceedings expeditiously. We therefore conclude that denial of a fair trial to a [party] is reversible per se.

Applicant was denied the opportunity to cross-examine PQME Dr. Schmitz on a significant supplemental report, which denied her a fair trial and due process, warranting reconsideration and further proceedings.

Official decision · page 7 →

ADJ19532643 · 2026-05-18 · Marina del Rey District OfficeTemporary disabilityapplicant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.7At trial, when the Applicant was presented with this deposition testimony, she explained that she may have misspoken at the deposition, and that it was more a desire to retire just from CVS, (MOH/SOE page 6, lines 12-14). She stated that she is planning to renew her pharmaceutical license, and that as of the date of trial, she was taking the necessary classes towards that end, (MOH/SOE page 5, lines 9-12). She further testified that a job in the pharmaceutical field was offered to her sometime in April or May of 2024, but due to her shoulder injury, she did not accept it, and that she does not [at this time] feel comfortable returning to the work force, (MOH/SOE page 5, lines 17-25). She is currently looking online for work opportunities, and testified that when she retired from CVS, she told management that she was intending to retire from that company only, (MOH/SOE page 6, lines 1-5). No witnesses from management at CVS provided testimony contradicting the last statement.

The WCJ found applicant intended to retire only from the employer, not the labor market entirely, supported by credible trial testimony showing willingness to work post-retirement despite injury, and no contrary evidence from defendant.

Official decision · page 7 →

ADJ16023818 · 2026-05-08 · Van Nuys District OfficeTemporary disabilityapplicant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.7Here, we apply the above reasoning with respect to our responsibility to consider the actual language of the agreement to the Stipulations. Paragraphs 1 and 2 require that the information must be correctly provided. Here, it was not. In Paragraph 1, which is a stipulation as to injury and the date of injury, the injury was described as a specific injury. In Paragraph 2, which is a stipulation as to temporary disability, including periods of payment and rate of payment, the only statement was "SEE BELOW." Moreover, there is nothing in Paragraph 9 to indicate what type of temporary

The WCAB found that the Stipulations did not resolve the period of temporary disability from December 29, 2021 through June 3, 2022, and that the WCJ failed to properly analyze the restoration of time and payment rate. The WCAB granted reconsideration and returned the matter for further proceedings to determine the correct periods and amounts owed.

Official decision · page 7 →

ADJ11351201 · 2026-05-07 · Los Angeles District OfficeAOE/COEremanded

Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of the Findings and Order (F&O) issued on February 27, 2023, by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The WCJ found in pertinent part that applicant did not sustain industrial injury to his eyes, neck, shoulders, arms, hands, fingers, legs, ankles, circulatory and excretory system, and psyche and ordered that applicant take nothing on his claims.

The WCAB found the record insufficient to resolve conflicting medical opinions on industrial causation, including orthopedic, neurological, and psychiatric claims, requiring further development of the medical record.

Official decision · page 1 →

ADJ21172307 · 2026-04-27 · Sacramento District OfficeAOE/COEdefendant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.3Liability for workers' compensation accrues for an injury "arising out of and in the course of the employment." (Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a).) Injuries sustained while an employee is "going and coming" to and from the place of employment do not normally arise out of and in the course of employment because the employee is neither providing benefit to the employer nor under the control of the employer during that commute. (Santa Rosa Junior College v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 345, 351§ 352 [1985 Cal. LEXIS 410]; Hinojosa v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 157 [37 Cal.Comp.Cases 734].) "[T]he going and coming rule applies when the employee is commuting between his home and work or, as Hinojosa characterizes it, it applies to a `local commute enroute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours.' (Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 157.)" (Zhu v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1031, 1038 [82 Cal.Comp.Cases 692].)

The WCJ and the Board found that the injury occurred during the applicant's regular commute and did not fall within any exceptions to the going and coming rule, including the zone of employment or special risk exceptions, and thus the claim was barred.

Official decision · page 3 →

ADJ20169304 · 2026-04-20 · Redding District OfficePsyche AOE/COEremanded

Determinative passage · p.11evidence. PQME Dr. Taylor discusses many contributing factors he believes have a bearing on the cause of applicant's claimed injury to provide percentages of causation, but PQME Dr. Taylor does not provide the reasoning linking the factors to the injury. This defect is not cured by referring to clinical expertise and years of training. Further, PQME Dr. Taylor provided opinions based on an incomplete record and appears to have relied on an incorrect history. In summary, PQME Dr. Taylor's opinions are not substantial evidence. (Hegglin, supra, pp. 169-170.)

PQME Dr. Taylor's opinions on causation were found not to be substantial medical evidence due to lack of reasoning, incomplete record, and incorrect history; therefore, the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Official decision · page 11 →

ADJ19984698 · 2026-04-14 · Marina del Rey District OfficeQME/AME processdefendant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.1Defendant seeks removal of the Joint Findings of Fact and Order (F&O) issued on January 12, 2026 by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The F&O found, in pertinent part, that applicant validly requested a Replacement QME Panel on March 5, 2025 (to replace panel number 3593170). The WCJ ordered that replacement QME panel number 3622506 replace panel number 3593170, leaving, after the striking process previously performed by the parties, Kofi D. Agyeman, M.D., as the orthopedic surgery QME in these matters.

The WCJ and Appeals Board found that the applicant validly requested a replacement QME panel due to Dr. Willoughby's unavailability to schedule within 120 days, and that the replacement panel and Dr. Agyeman as QME were properly appointed.

Official decision · page 1 →

ADJ21105749 · 2026-04-14 · Redding District OfficeAOE/COEdefendant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of a workers' compensation administrative law judge's (WCJ) Findings and Order of January 5, 2026, wherein it was found that applicant "did not sustain any injury arising out of and occurring in the course of employment." Applicant claimed that while employed on June 4, 2025 as an IT Analyst, he sustained industrial injury to his right shoulder.

The WCJ's credibility determinations were supported by substantial evidence, including witness testimony and applicant's inconsistent statements, leading to denial of industrial injury claim.

Official decision · page 1 →

ADJ9744423 · 2026-03-27 · Sacramento District OfficeSJDB voucherapplicant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.5Here, the WCJ issued a finding that defendant mailed the SJDV to applicant's address on the Official Address Record, which appears correct. However, the unrebutted testimony of applicant is that he was not living at that address at the time of service and that he did not receive the voucher. The WCJ found applicant's testimony credible. (See Garza, supra.) Thus, the evidentiary presumption is rebutted, and we will find that applicant did not receive the SJDV that defendant mailed in 2019.

Applicant's credible testimony that he did not receive the voucher rebutted the presumption of receipt, leading to a finding that applicant did not receive the voucher mailed to the official address record.

Official decision · page 5 →

ADJ13057169 · 2026-03-12 · San Francisco District OfficePermanent disability ratingapplicant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.8Defendant contends that the WCJ's adoption of Dr. Burt's Almaraz-Guzman rating was an "improper deviation from the permanent disability rating schedule." (Petition, p. 10.)

The WCJ's adoption of Dr. Burt's Almaraz-Guzman rating was supported by substantial medical evidence, including a thorough explanation of the alternative rating method and the synergistic effect of multiple injuries, consistent with Almaraz-Guzman II and Vigil standards.

Official decision · page 8 →

Also recorded as

The same firm is printed several ways across the decisions, and all of them were counted as one. These are the twelve commonest of 17.

MICHAEL SULLIVAN & ASSOCIATES

MICHAEL SULLIVAN & ASSOCIATES LLP

Michael Sullivan & Associates

Michael Sullivan & Associates LLP

MICHAEL SULLIVAN AND ASSOCIATES

MICHAEL SULLIVAN & ASSOCIATES, LLP

MICHAEL SULLIVAN LAW

Michael Sullivan & Associates, LLP

Michael Sullivan and Associates

Law Office of Michael Sullivan

LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL SULLIVAN & ASSOCIATES

Law Offices of Michael Sullivan